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The article in Nanfang zhoumo, published just aheadof the 17th National Congress of the CommunistParty of China (CPC), attempts to shed light on the
world, “both known and obscure,” of the official Chinese re-
search centres and their influence over decision-making in
China. Chinese leaders have been making great play of their
desire for their decision-making to be more “scientific and
democratic”:((1) in that context, the research carried out by
Nanfang zhoumo updates its readers on how relations be-
tween China’s decision-makers and its research community
have evolved and taken institutional shape.
The survey portrays the best known of the Chinese think
tanks and identifies how they interact with the decision-mak-
ers; it also describes the various channels available to them
for communicating their views: colloquiums, brainstorming
sessions, reports, articles, and personal meetings when called
in by political leaders. Looking more closely at the writer’s
depiction, it would seem that the think tanks’ influence de-
rives as much from the standing of the research institute as
from personal affinities between leaders and experts. 
Ma identifies two types of research centres, the first being
the training establishments for officials, among them the
Central Party School and the School of Administrative
Studies, where leaders from different provinces can meet
and exchange views with the experts.
Since the Central Party School provides guidance, advice, and
training in the ideological field, it is not surprising to find jour-
nalists eager to scrutinise the commentaries of those who teach
there, especially during Party Congresses and before important
political announcements. The lecturers’ regular exchanges with
Party officials and their frequent participation in drawing up
government papers make them reliable indicators of political
trends. A notable illustration: as early as 25 June 2007, the of-
ficial Xinhua news agency highlighted the importance of Hu
Jintao’s speech to the Central Party School as indicative of the
political line to be adopted by the 17th National Congress.((2)
The School of Administrative Studies (guojia xingzheng
xueyuan) also helps with official texts and contributes to re-
search in the general areas of political and economic re-
forms. It recently carried out a study of the social security
system for the State Council. It provides two such studies
each year on average, commissioned by working groups com-
posed of ministers, deputy ministers, or local leaders. The
working groups pass on their reports to the State Council,
and their conclusions are then opened up for informal dis-
cussions between government leaders and researchers. The
State Council may eventually issue a statement on the sub-
ject, and a ministerial group will combine the “spirit of that
statement” with the working group’s conclusions to make im-
provements to the text. This final text is submitted to the
State Council for approval.
Thus, in 1998, the School of Administrative Studies carried
out research projects on reforming and supervising the bank-
ing system; in 2000, it examined how the policy of “develop-
ing the West” (xibu kaifa) should be implemented; in 2007,
the two meetings were related to questions of social security
and healthcare. The Central Party School is said to proceed
in the same way, but tackling subjects in different areas.
The research centres depending directly on the State Coun-
cil, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences (CAS and CASS) or the
powerful Centre for Macroeconomic Research of the Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
provide anywhere between 200 and 400 studies a year.
They are also involved in researching and preparing texts for
the five-year plans and for administrative regulations, mainly
in the economic sphere, whereas the Schools contribute to
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preparing speeches for National Party Congresses or for ple-
nary sessions of the Central Committee.
What are the channels of communication and influence that
the think tanks use? The writer identifies many different av-
enues of communication between the institutions and the de-
cision-makers, beginning with studies commissioned by the
leaders, sometimes even on a commercial basis. The reports
may deal with cross-disciplinary subjects such as macroeco-
nomic regulation or social security, or more specialised ques-
tions arising within specific fields of competence; sometimes
the experts are required to work directly with state-owned
companies to support the implementation of a policy initia-
tive. Most projects extend over a certain period, especially
the preparatory research for five-year plans undertaken by
the NRDC’s research bodies. Others may be shorter or
even emergency operations, as was the case during the
Asian financial crisis or in the wake of 9/11. 
The specialists may also exert their influence through the “in-
ternal” publications available to them. Their contributions are
not necessarily commissioned by the authorities but are often
read by senior officials, who may subsequently choose to fol-
low up with personal meetings with the experts. Similarly,
Ma reports that an official or his secretary may sometimes
keep an eye on a specific experts’ work, asking for internal
studies to be passed on to him immediately upon publication. 
But the experts exert their most direct influence through the
medium of personal meetings, on the sidelines of lectures or
symposiums, at private interviews, or at study sessions of the
Politburo, during which experts are brought in to expound
on their specialised subjects.
In sum, the frequency of interaction and the number of re-
ports that these research centres are required to produce
have increased steadily since the start of the reforms and
opening up; but over the past decade they have proliferated
as the questions addressed have become more complex and
China’s leaders strive to rationalise their decision-making
procedures. The experts are more in demand. They are lis-
tened to more intently. Wen Jiabao himself declared that no
specialist would ever suffer for his opinions. 
It is noteworthy that the role and status of the centres special-
ising in international relations and those of the university cen-
tres are not mentioned here. We may also point out that while
the Development Research Centre of the State Council is
duly mentioned, few details are offered. While the experts’ in-
fluence is sought after, their place in the system remains am-
biguous: the report writer agrees to withhold his political rec-
ommendations unless explicitly asked to express them. How-
ever, for outside observers, given the frequent contacts be-
tween these experts and political leaders, any such recommen-
dations do take on an official colouring. By way of example, at
the time of the Asian financial crisis, when China had decided
not to devalue the Renminbi, a researcher had indicated in the
press his support for some flexibility in the Chinese currency.
The result was destabilisation of the Hong Kong markets, and
the situation was recovered only after the NRDC announced
its public support for the stability of the currency . . .
Yet, there is no doubt that Chinese leaders are, more than
ever before, willing to call in the experts on a variety of ques-
tions, and that the experts bring influence to bear -- directly
or indirectly, consciously or not -- on the decisions taken by
Chinese politicial leaders. The last word belongs to Ma: 
“At the start of the reforms, it was the economists who
were fqvoured; following the 15th National Congress it
was the lawyers who were most sought after; but now
the moment has come for the sociologists.” •
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Relations between France and China: 
the Break . . . with Germany?
Compiled and commented by Mathieu Duchâtel, based on:
• Luo Shaolan, “Sarkozy’s visit to China, a mission to set the tone for France-China relations.” Yazhou shibao zaixian
(atchinese.com), 26 November 2007.
• Luo Shaolan, “China’s relations with Germany: are they cooling off?” Yazhou shibao zaixian (atchinese.com), 
26 November 2007.
• Pan Xiaoshou, “Allowing Sarkozy to touch the Terracotta army: what did it mean?” Yazhou shibao zaixian (atchinese.com), 
27 November 2007.
LPresident Sarkozy was welcomed to China as no for-eign head of state has been welcomed since Presi-dent Clinton in 1998: nearly 20 billion euros’ worth
of contracts, a lavish dinner with Hu Jintao (French haute
cuisine rather than the customary Chinese specialities), and
permission to touch the precious soldiers of Emperor Qin
Shihuang’s Terracotta Army in Xian. Pan Xiaoshou writes
that Beijing’s evident intention was to soften him up (keyi
taohao). Back in 1998, Beijing needed a substantial im-
provement in its relations with Washington. Today, now that
China’s international standing has considerably improved
and its relations with France are far from being in crisis, why
